INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing problems in drug and device regulation is "off-label" promotion-when a company markets uses for a product that have not been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Off-label use can range from conspicuous (prescribing a product for an unapproved medical condition or patient group) to more subtle (prescribing beyond the approved dosage, duration, or any other parameter set forth in the approved labeling). The challenge posed by off-label promotion derives from a well-established dichotomy: the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate manufacturers and the claims they make about their products, but has no jurisdiction to regulate the practice of medicine or physicians' prescribing behavior.I This dichotomy not only creates the temptation for companies to promote off-label uses, but also creates a regulatory conundrum for the FDA.
The stakes are considerable. Companies earn billions from off-label prescriptions, as physicians may prescribe products "independently from, and occasionally in defiance of, the approved labeling."2 Such prescribing can be critical in certain therapeutic areas, particularly those in which research findings greatly outpace the FDA approval process. 3 As such, off-label uses can be common and evidence based.4 Indeed, off-label uses can even constitute the standard of care in disciplines like oncology, neurology, Given the stakes, then, it is surprising that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Acts (FDCA) "do[es] not expressly prohibit the promotion or marketing of drugs for off-label use."16 Others have also questioned the statutory basis for the prohibition. 17 The FDA itself notes that " [p] romoting an approved drug for off-label uses is not itself a prohibited act under the FDCA, nor is it an element of any prohibited act." 18 Instead, the FDA argues, offlabel promotion "plays an evidentiary role in determining whether a drug is misbranded." 19 Nevertheless, almost no one has seriously undertaken the statutory question: Does the FDCA support the FDA's functional ban on off-label promotion?20 This Essay answers yes. Although the phrases "off-label" and "extra-label" are mentioned only once each in Title 21, both in glancing ways, 21 I find that multiple sections of the FDCA either assume or contemplate a ban on off-label promotion. I also find, using various tools of statutory construction, that the FDCA as a whole depends on the ban. Without it, significant portions of the statute would be hollow or even nonsensical, and the FDA's approval schemes-the lodestar of medical product regulation-would collapse under their own weight.
The statutory case against off-label promotion, then, is quite complex, and requires a fair bit of description of the statute, the FDA's logic, and how both evolved. The government must tailor its statutory logic depending on whether the off-label promotion qualifies as "labeling," "advertising," or something else, such as oral statements. Part I, then, describes the many faces of promotion, before turning to the detailed statutory logic that some offlabel promotion qualifies as labeling (Part II), as advertising (Part III), or as oral statements (Part IV), respectively. The payoff, I hope, is a concise application of the tools of construction in Part V. In short, the statutory case against off-label promotion is complicated but compelling.
I. THE MANY FACES OF PROMOTION
Off-label promotion can take many forms. Because drug and device markets can be highly competitive, firms have devised ever more creative ways to promote their products. The classic scenario is "detailing," when a sales representative visits a physician's office to discuss a product in person, sometimes leaving behind written materials.22 Beyond detailing, firms have used continuing medical education (CME) events 23 and paid for meals, travel, or entertainment to promote products off-label.24 Companies have also paid prescribers as speakers, consultants, advisors, or preceptors in order to suggest off-label uses for their products. 25 Even more questionable practices include funding sham educational and research "grants" that involve unapproved uses, or even hiring ghostwriters to publish journal articles discussing offlabel uses under the name of a respected "thought leader." 26 And then, of course, there is the menu of more traditional advertisements via television, radio, and print, which are often used as vehicles for suggesting off-label uses. More recently, the FDA has confronted companies online, where they use Internet advertising and social media to suggest off-label uses for their products. For example, companies have purchased sponsored links and search engine terms that suggest unapproved uses.
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Finally, companies frequently distribute to prescribers medical reference texts and journal article reprints that discuss offlabel uses-which are not labeling or advertising when written, but may transform into such if used by the manufacturer that way.
Thus, virtually every form of promotion is a potential vessel for off-label messages. Yet, regardless of the form, rarely is the message a singular, isolated event; typically it occurs as part of a broader marketing scheme.28 The question for the government, then, is whether these messages qualify as labeling, advertising, or something else under the FDCA. The next three Parts (II-IV) describe the statutory logic.
II. OFF-LABEL PROMOTION VIA LABELING
According to the FDA, off-label promotion via "labeling" can violate both the new drug and misbranding sections of the statute. An important preface is that labeling is defined very broadly to cover a wide variety of statements or claims made by or on behalf of the manufacturer, in a wide variety of contexts. The FDCA defines "labeling" as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article."29 The latter clause is particularly important. Several early court decisions-including some that predated the 1938 Act30--interpreted "accompanying" to include materials that supplement or explain a product, even if distributed separately from it.31 In fact, after Congress passed the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act,32 companies frequently removed controversial product claims from packaging and distributed them separately via brochures or circulars to evade FDA jurisdiction, which under the 1906 Act was limited to packaging.33
As concerns grew over companies giving false or misleading materials to physicians,34 the FDA defined "labeling" more broadly by rule.35 Today, the FDA defines "labeling" as virtually any "printed, audio, or visual matter" that describes a drug and is "disseminated by or on behalf of [the] manufacturer."36
Defining "labeling" broadly is critical to the FDA's argument that off-label promotion violates the FDCA. As construed by courts, the content of the material determines whether it is labeling. Indeed, a recent case found that a company press release constituted labeling.37 If off-label promotion qualifies as labeling, the FDA can argue that the company violates the FDCA by introducing an unapproved "new drug" into interstate commerce, by misbranding the product, or both.
A. The "New Drug" Provisions
In some cases, the government alleges that off-label promotion violates the "new drug" provisions of the FDCA. (2006) (describing "how FDA asserted jurisdiction over drug-and devicerelated press releases through its authority over labeling, promotional labeling, and advertising"). promotion via advertising or oral statements, 41 which I address below. The new drug provisions are also less useful if the company can argue that the drug is "generally recognized as safe and effective," in which case it is not a new drug at all, or if the drug is a biologic approved under the Public Health Service Act42 rather than the FDCA.43 Nevertheless, the broad definition of "labeling" helps the FDA argue that products promoted off-label are unapproved new drugs.
B. Misbranding
More commonly, the FDA relies on the FDCA's misbranding provisions to prosecute off-label promotion, though the statutory case is much more attenuated.
First, off-label promotion that is false or misleading can misbrand a product under FDCA § 301(a), which prohibits introducing a misbranded product into interstate commerce. 44 Section 502(a) provides that a product is misbranded "[i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular." 45Although such an allegation is relatively straightforward as a statutory matter, it can be difficult for the government to prove. Typically, the off-label claim is very much in dispute-scientifically, medically, factually-and so the government must show that the claim misleads. Not surprisingly, then, most of the literature on off-label promotion focuses on cases in which the claim is not necessarily false or misleading. 46 More frequently, the FDA must make a more attenuated, multistep argument that the product is misbranded.47 This argument relies on the statutory requirement that product labeling provide "adequate directions for use."48 The chain of reasoning requires a fair bit of explanation.
Section 502(f)(1) declares a product misbranded unless its labeling bears "adequate directions for use."49 However, this section 41 44 FDCA § 30 1(a), 52 Stat at 1042, codified at 21 USC § 331(a). The FDA sometimes uses FDCA § 301(k) for products that are misbranded while being held for sale, after shipment in interstate commerce. 21 USC § 331(k). If misbranding is done "with the intent to defraud or mislead," it is subject to additional penalty under 21 USC § 333(a)(2).
45 FDCA § 502(a), 52 Stat at 1050, codified at 21 USC § 352(a).
exempts drugs and devices for which adequate directions are "not necessary for the protection of the public health." 50 The FDA has interpreted this to exempt all prescription drugs, thus requiring adequate directions only for over-the-counter drugs.51 By rule, the FDA has created a series of conditions to qualify for the exemption.52 Instead of adequate directions, the FDA expects prescription drugs to provide "adequate information" for safe use by practitioners.53 Thus, labeling must include all "indications" for the drug, "including all purposes for which it is advertised or represented." 54Moreover, the regulations require that any labeling that mentions the uses or dosages for the product may not deviate from the uses and dosages specified in the FDA-approved physician labeling.55 Providing "adequate information" for prescribers, then, means including information about "indications, effects, dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administration."56 All labeling must use the "same [] language and emphasis" and must be "consistent with and not contrary to" the FDA-approved labeling.57
Thus, failure to list all indications for the product or failure to use the same language used in the approved labeling can misbrand the product and jeopardize its exemption from the "adequate directions" requirement in § 502(f)(1). 58 In essence, to be exempt, any labeling for prescription drugs must disclose all intended uses; otherwise, the product is misbranded.
Importantly, FDA regulations declare that the manufacturer's intended uses can be gleaned from a variety of sources, including "labeling [ ], advertising [ ], or oral or written statements."5o As these regulations make clear, "intended use" is the "objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling" of the product, and can be determined by their "expressions," including "labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their representatives."60 Objective intent can also be determined "by the circumstances surrounding the distribution" of the product.61 Thus, a company's knowledge that its product is "offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised" can be evidence of intent.62
This "incorporation-by-reference theory"63 creates a catch-22, or what observers call the "squeeze play" against off-label promotion: companies that do not disclose off-label uses in their physician labeling misbrand the product by failing to provide adequate directions for laypersons or adequate information for prescribers; but companies that try to amend their labeling to provide such information misbrand the product or cause the product to be an unapproved new drug.64
This interpretation "encountered little resistance from the courts," and "may be the most powerful tool that FDA has against most forms of off-label promotion."65 The FDA developed this argument shortly after Congress passed the FDCA in 1938.66 It began as a rule to require labeling to include adequate directions for indications claimed in advertising.67 In the 1938 Act, Congress had chosen to vest authority over advertising for FDA-regulated products with the Federal Trade Commission rather than the FDA, over the FDA's bitter opposition.68 Thus, the statutory basis for the FDA's 1938 regulation was questionable. In fact, it took almost a decade for the FDA to test it in court.
69
A skeptical Justice Department asked the FDA to explain its authority.70 The response, though unavailable, most likely relied on the idea held by FDA officials then that the agency would not be challenging advertising claims themselves, but instead would use those claims as evidence to challenge deficiencies in the product's labeling (the failure to include adequate directions).71 FDA officials explained that before the 1938 regulation was published, the agency had sent a draft to the House of Representatives legislative counsel, "who apparently had no objections, thus demonstrating that the regulation was consistent with congressional intent." 72 A few years later, a court accepted the FDA's argument that "adequate directions" focused on labeling deficiencies rather than impermissible advertising claims.73
Eventually, the FDA pushed the theory even further, arguing that a series of health lectures for a company could be used as evidence of intent.74 The agency argued that the company misbranded the products by failing to include adequate directions for the uses discussed during the lectures.75 Because the lectures could not be "labeling," the FDA argued that they were relevant only to show intended use, and that the drugs were misbranded only because their labeling failed to state their uses as required by the Act.76 The court agreed.77
Emboldened by these victories, the FDA amended the regulation to require adequate directions not only for uses suggested in advertising, but also for uses suggested in other contexts. The modern "squeeze play," then, derives from the FDA's very early aggressive interpretation of the Act, which was driven by its initial lack of jurisdiction over advertising.78
III. OFF-LABEL PROMOTION VIA ADVERTISING
If off-label promotion occurs via advertising rather than labeling, the FDA can allege violations of multiple sections of the FDCA-again, none of which explicitly prohibits such promotion.
First, § 303(g) of the Act prohibits direct-to-consumer advertising that is false or misleading,79 which might form the basis for a straightforward complaint. But, as noted above, such claims are difficult to prosecute if they are at all subject to unsettled or conflicting scientific evidence. Finally, if the off-label claims are made via oral statements, then the FDA must use even different statutory logic. As with claims made via labeling, the FDA uses a complicated squeeze play, relying on the adequate directions requirement in § 502(f)(1). Again, the squeeze play puts companies in a catch-22: one can misbrand a product by failing to provide adequate directions for laypersons or adequate information for prescribers, or one can amend the labeling to include off-label uses and thus misbrand the product or create an unapproved new drug.86 Again, the intended use doctrine87 allows the FDA to take action against marketers based on the content of their communications, without necessarily asserting jurisdiction over the communications themselves,88 a distinction recently rejected by the Second Circuit.89 FDA regulations extend this logic to oral statements, even though such statements are not "written, printed, or graphic matter" that would qualify as "labeling."90 Indeed, the FDA rule that defines "adequate directions" makes clear that intended uses include uses suggested orally.91 As such, FDA warning letters have objected to oral presentations by sales representatives in physicians' offices, at exhibit booths, or before formulary boards.92 An important caveat here is First Amendment doctrine. The Second Circuit recently sustained a First Amendment defense by Alfred Caronia, a sales representative who had been convicted for promoting the narcolepsy drug Xyrem for unapproved indications such as fibromylagia, muscle disorders, and chronic pain.93 He was surreptitiously recorded discussing these and several other off-label uses for Xyrem. The court found that the FDA had "treated promotional speech as more than merely evidence of a drug's intended use," and had "construed the FDCA to prohibit promotional speech as misbranding itself."94 Apparently, this is a matter of degree-the Second Circuit emphasized the extent to which the government objected to Caronia's speech in its briefs and during trial, in comparison to how little it focused on the statutory violation.9 The dissent argued that drug regulation has relied on intended use for over a century, and that courts have used
B. The Text
The text of the FDCA, as detailed above, broadly prohibits misbranding and introducing unapproved new products into interstate commerce, 104 and broadly defines "labeling," which is used to determine both types of violations 105 Although these provisions do not expressly prohibit off-label promotion, these and other provisions do broadly authorize the FDA to establish the conditions under which drugs and devices may be legally marketed.106 Indeed, former FDA Chief Counsel Peter Barton Hutt once declared that "the Act must be regarded as a constitution" that "establishes a set of fundamental objectives . . . without attempting to specify every detail of regulation." 107 Although courts have questioned in egregious cases how far this principle can stretch,108 they have generally confirmed the FDA's broad authority.
Moreover, contrary to the Second Circuit's very cursory analysis, 109 the FDCA is not completely silent on off-label marketing. Multiple sections contemplate or assume a ban on it. Under a section titled "Practice of Medicine," the Act states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease." 110 Thus, the FDCA specifically contemplates offlabel prescribing of medical products. However, the same provision continues: "This section shall not limit any existing authority of the Secretary to establish and enforce restrictions on the sale or distribution, or in the labeling, of a device. . . . Further, this section shall not change any existing prohibition on the promotion of unapproved uses of legally marketed devices."111 Thus, Congress recognized in the text of the FDCA itself an "existing prohibition" against off-label promotion.
The FDCA also nods to off-label use in another section authorizing unapproved uses of approved products in emergencies. 112 Here, the statute defines "unapproved use of an approved product" as use of a product that is "is approved, licensed, or cleared under [the FDCA], but which use is not under such provision an approved, licensed, or cleared use of the product." 113 The section then sets forth extensive criteria for the FDA to grant authorization for emergency off-label uses, 114 including limited advertising and promotion for such. 115 This is strong evidence that Congress read the Act as empowering the FDA to prohibit offlabel promotion.
C. Whole Act Rule
Although there are dozens of canons of construction, 116 a few seem especially pertinent here. First, the "whole act rule" and its corollaries tell courts to construe statutory provisions in light of the entire statute, rather than in isolation. 117 Courts should avoid constructions that are inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute, with other provisions, or with subsequent amendments. 118 When considering the FDCA as a whole, one can find dozens of provisions that would make little sense if off-label promotion were widely permissible. In particular, the "new drug" provisions in § 505,119 which span dozens of pages and include dozens of subsections, would be seriously undermined without such a prohibition. Section 505 creates a comprehensive system for manufacturers to conduct clinical trials and submit "substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof." 120 The statute defines "substantial evidence" as "adequate and well-controlled investigations."121 Given that most off-label claims are supported by something far less than "adequate and well-controlled investigations," interpreting the Act to permit such promotion would undermine "supplemental applications," which are mentioned numerous times in the statute. Indeed, the FDCA includes forty-five separate sections that refer to "new drugs" and seventeen sections that refer to "supplemental applications."122 Moreover, massive parts of the Code of Federal Regulations are predicated on these authorities and have been in use for decades.123 Thus, these statutory provisions endow the FDA with important gatekeeping authority over new drugs, including the conditions under which they can be legally marketed.124
That said, it is somewhat odd that the prohibition against offlabel promotion is buried in the statutory requirement that products must provide adequate directions for use. 125 But, again, this is most likely a remnant of the original struggle by the FDA to overcome limits in its legal authority over drug advertising. 126
D. Avoiding Absurdity
Another canon invoked by courts is to avoid statutory interpretations that create absurd results. 127 One can argue that the FDCA should be interpreted to prohibit off-label promotion because it would be absurd not to. The most salient feature of FDA regulation over pharmaceuticals is its gatekeeping authority-the authority to require manufacturers to conduct clinical trials and show "substantial evidence" that a drug is safe and effective for its intended uses. 128 The new drug approval system, then, is the centerpiece of pharmaceutical regulation. 129 Indeed, when the government's interest in prohibiting off-label claims is at issue, typically in First Amendment cases, 130 the FDA often argues that its entire drug approval scheme relies on the ability to identify intended uses. Without it, companies would have little incentive to conduct clinical trials and file supplemental new drug approval applications for new uses. Companies instead would have an incentive to seek the narrowest and least controversial uses for initial approval, then easily expand the product's indications through aggressive marketing. Unsubstantiated claims would flood the drug market, much like they do the market for dietary supplements,131 which are not subject to premarket review. It is no accident, then, that the government's interest in regulating off-label promotion and preserving the drug approval system is virtually always found to be "substantial" for First Amendment purposes. 132 The prohibition against off-label promotion is thus key to the integrity of the drug approval scheme that the FDCA constructs so carefully. 133 Without evidence of intended use, "this regulatory machinery for protecting patients from unsafe and ineffective drugs would be drastically impaired." 134 It would also draw into question not only the century-old intended use doctrine, but also the very definitions of "drug" and "device," which also depend on intent. 135 Moreover, if the FDA knew that once a drug was approved, it could be legally marketed for any use, the agency might weigh the benefits and risks less charitably in the first instance. 136 Surely this must be an absurd result.
E. The Avoidance Canon
The Second Circuit in Caronia invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe the FDCA as not prohibiting "mere off-label promotion," on the logic that "such a construction would raise First Amendment concerns." 137 The avoidance canon directs courts to choose interpretations that would not render the statute unconstitutional or raise serious questions about its constitutionality. 138 On first glance, because the Second Circuit indeed found a First Amendment violation, it is not surprising that the court invoked the canon. But on second glance, it is curious to rely heavily on the avoidance canon here. For decades, courts have construed the FDCA in light of First Amendment limitations.139 Moreover, Caronia was an as-applied challenge rather than a facial challenge. The court was asked whether the FDA's policy, applied to Caronia, violated his First Amendment rights, not whether the FDCA permitted the FDA's policy as a threshold matter. 140 Thus, although technically not prevented from relying on the avoidance canon, it seems bizarre to invoke it without considering other tools of construction.
F. Congressional Approval or Acquiescence
A complementary argument is that the FDA's interpretations are old and well-established, yet Congress has never seen fit to amend the statute otherwise, suggesting Congress has acquiesced to the FDA's position. 141 Congress has amended the FDCA more than one hundred times since 1938, 142 and not once did it feel the need to clarify or reject the prohibition against off-label promotion.
If one is not persuaded that Congress can endorse the FDA's position by inaction, then consider past congressional action. In 1997, Congress affirmed the FDA's position when it passed the 137 Id at 160. 138 144 The clear implication was that these three sections otherwise prohibited off-label promotion. FDAMA § 401 thus exempted qualifying materials from being considered as evidence of a new intended use. 145 Moreover, the law declared that dissemination of qualifying materials "shall not be considered . . . as labeling, adulteration, or misbranding." 146 Thus, through duly enacted legislation, Congress assumed that the FDCA prohibited off-label promotion, and in fact crafted a narrow exemption from the prohibition. The only "prohibited act" FDAMA added to the FDCA was to declare it a misbranding violation to disseminate off-label information in violation of the new exemption. 147
CONCLUSION
The FDA's "prohibition" against off-label promotion has been questioned numerous times, but few have engaged in a rigorous analysis of its statutory foundation, particularly applying tools of construction. Applying these tools and engaging in a close textual analysis reveals a complex but compelling statutory case. Almost eighty years ago, Congress endowed the FDA with broad powers via a broadly worded statute. For just as long, both the agency and the courts have interpreted those powers accordingly to address emerging problems. Congress, in turn, has incorporated these interpretations, including the functional ban on off-label promotion. As a result, subsequent amendments to the FDCA either assume or contemplate a prohibition against off-label promotion. This long evolution has created a complex statutory basis for prohibiting off-label promotion, but a solid basis nonetheless. 
